The $20 Billion FIFA Deal Died. Now UEFA Wants the Deal Files.

Case Analysis | September 14, 2026

The transaction is dead. The paper trail is not.

FIFA abandoned its controversial Forward Enterprise proposal this summer after a revolt over a plan that would have opened part of the commercial business surrounding the World Cup and other FIFA competitions to private capital. But UEFA is now trying to reconstruct how that transaction was conceived, valued, negotiated, and advanced—and it has come to federal court in New York to do it.

The target is not FIFA itself. At least not in this case.

On August 27, UEFA filed an application in the Southern District of New York seeking permission to subpoena New York investment firm Thrive Capital Management and its founder, Joshua Kushner. UEFA wants internal valuation work, term sheets, communications with FIFA officials and advisers, investor materials, diligence records, and deposition testimony concerning FIFA Forward Enterprise, or “FFE.” UEFA says it is gathering evidence for a contemplated Swiss criminal proceeding alleging possible criminal mismanagement by FIFA President Gianni Infantino and potentially others. No criminal complaint has yet produced charges, no prosecutor has found wrongdoing, and Thrive and Kushner are not accused of misconduct.

That distinction matters.

This is not yet a criminal case against Infantino. It is not a civil fraud action against FIFA. It is not an adjudication that the proposed transaction was improperly valued. And Judge Jeannette A. Vargas has not ruled that UEFA is entitled to the discovery.

Instead, the dispute currently sits one procedural layer earlier: Can UEFA use an American federal court to obtain evidence for a foreign proceeding it says it is seriously contemplating—but has not yet commenced?

And before Judge Vargas answers even that question, FIFA’s American subsidiaries want a seat at the table.

That makes this less a case about whether a private-equity deal was good or bad than a case about how cross-border investigations get built.

FIFA Forward Enterprise was an unusually ambitious proposal to separate and monetize part of FIFA’s commercial operations. Public reporting described a structure under which outside investors, with Thrive expected to serve as an anchor investor, could invest roughly $4.2 billion for approximately a 20% interest in an enterprise associated with FIFA’s commercial rights, implying a valuation around $20 billion. FIFA would retain football-governance authority. The proposal never closed and was withdrawn on August 1 after significant opposition within international soccer.

UEFA’s legal theory is not simply that somebody offered FIFA too little money.

Its application says it is evaluating whether Infantino and possibly other FIFA officials committed criminal mismanagement under Article 158 of the Swiss Criminal Code. That provision generally addresses a person entrusted with managing another’s assets who breaches management duties and thereby causes financial loss; an aggravated form applies where the conduct is undertaken to secure an unlawful gain. Those are presently UEFA’s allegations and legal theories, not judicial findings.

To investigate that theory, UEFA wants to know considerably more than the final headline valuation.

Its proposed discovery reaches the origins and development of FFE; communications involving Thrive, Kushner, Infantino, former Liberty Media chief Greg Maffei, FIFA officials, advisers, and intermediaries; valuation models and comparables; term sheets and draft investment documents; contemplated returns and exit rights; governance provisions; potential co-investors and capital sources; the timing of investor commitments; internal diligence and risk assessments; and communications concerning whether the proposal might be revived, modified, or abandoned. UEFA also seeks deposition testimony from Kushner and a Thrive corporate representative.

In other words, UEFA does not merely want the deal.

It wants the deal-making process.

That is often where investigations become dangerous. A final board presentation may show what management ultimately approved. Internal emails, draft models, valuation changes, diligence memoranda, and sequencing documents can show who knew what, when they knew it, what alternatives were considered, and whether formal approval came before or after a transaction had effectively acquired momentum.

UEFA is proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, a statute that gives federal district courts power to order testimony or document production from a person found within the district when the evidence is sought “for use” in a proceeding before a foreign or international tribunal.

The statute is broader than many non-litigators would expect. Congress expressly made it applicable to certain criminal investigations before formal accusation. And the Supreme Court held in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices that the foreign proceeding need not already be pending or even imminent. It must, however, be within “reasonable contemplation.”

That phrase is doing a great deal of work here.

The Second Circuit, whose law controls Judge Vargas, has warned that subjective plans to sue someday are not enough. In Certain Funds v. KPMG, the court held that an applicant must provide objective indications that the anticipated proceeding is genuinely likely to occur within a reasonable period. The contemplated case must be more than, in the Second Circuit’s memorable phrase, “a twinkle in counsel’s eye.”

That is the threshold UEFA must clear.

And it explains why the procedural posture of this case is more interesting than it may initially appear.

UEFA says the contemplated Swiss matter is real enough.

Its papers identify the potential defendant, the Swiss criminal provision at issue, the conduct it wants investigated, the categories of evidence it believes bear on that theory, and the reason U.S.-based discovery targets possess potentially relevant information. That is considerably more concrete than saying, “We might sue somebody someday.”

But FIFA’s U.S. subsidiaries have identified the obvious weakness: UEFA cannot itself prosecute Infantino.

Whether a Swiss criminal investigation ultimately proceeds depends on Swiss authorities. FIFA’s subsidiaries therefore argue that the supposed foreign proceeding does not presently exist, that UEFA is effectively collecting evidence in hopes of persuading authorities to create one, and that the application risks converting § 1782 into a privately directed pre-complaint investigation. They characterize the applications as a fishing expedition and part of a campaign against Infantino.

That is not a frivolous argument.

Intel makes clear that § 1782 can reach a criminal investigation before formal accusation. It also recognizes that someone need not be a traditional litigant to qualify as an “interested person.” But Intel involved a complainant with meaningful procedural rights before a body capable of making a dispositive ruling. The factual question here is different: what role will UEFA actually possess if it submits allegations to Swiss authorities, and is there a sufficiently concrete path by which the requested material will be placed before a qualifying tribunal?

Certain Funds makes that inquiry especially important in New York. There, the Second Circuit rejected discovery where the contemplated proceedings remained too speculative at the time the application was filed, even though litigation later materialized. The question is judged based on the circumstances when the evidence is sought.

So one of the most consequential questions before Judge Vargas may ultimately be surprisingly factual:

How far had UEFA actually progressed toward a Swiss criminal proceeding by August 27?

A drafted complaint, retained Swiss criminal counsel, identified charges, concrete plans to submit evidence, procedural rights under Swiss law, communications with authorities, or an established timetable could matter. A generalized desire to investigate Infantino would be much weaker.

The statute allows discovery before the foreign case exists. It does not allow the foreign case to be imaginary.

There is another preliminary fight.

FIFA (Americas) Inc. and FWC2026 US Inc.—two FIFA-affiliated U.S. entities—moved to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. They argue that UEFA’s requests implicate FIFA’s confidential information, that the discovery applications raise overlapping questions in several federal courts, and that FIFA-related interests will not necessarily be adequately protected by Thrive and Kushner. They have also asked Judge Vargas to defer action while a related § 1782 proceeding in Florida develops, or alternatively to allow them to brief the merits.

UEFA responded that the American entities are trying to fight a battle that belongs to somebody else.

In a September 10 filing reported the following day, UEFA argued that the subsidiaries are neither targets of the proposed Swiss proceeding nor recipients of the proposed Thrive subpoenas. Any confidentiality interest in FIFA documents, UEFA says, principally belongs to the Swiss parent organization. Thrive and Kushner, meanwhile, are represented and can challenge any subpoenas if Judge Vargas authorizes them. UEFA characterizes intervention as an unnecessary additional layer that would delay a discovery mechanism frequently initiated ex parte.

That intervention fight may sound technical. It is strategically important.

If FIFA’s subsidiaries get into the case now, UEFA faces an adversary prepared to attack the application before discovery is authorized. If intervention is denied and Judge Vargas grants the application ex parte, that still would not necessarily mean UEFA immediately receives everything it requested. Thrive and Kushner could seek to quash or narrow the subpoenas, invoke privilege, challenge burdensome requests, seek confidentiality protections, or contest particular categories under the Federal Rules.

So an order granting the application would be a meaningful win for UEFA—but not the end of the discovery fight.

As of September 14, almost nothing substantive in this particular New York proceeding.

That point should not be buried.

Judge Vargas has not held that Infantino engaged in misconduct. She has not held that FFE was improperly valued. She has not determined that UEFA’s contemplated Swiss criminal theory has merit. She has not decided that Thrive must produce documents. And she has not yet ruled on FIFA’s subsidiaries’ request to intervene. Reuters reported on September 11 that both the § 1782 application and intervention request remained pending.

The current significance therefore comes from the questions squarely presented to the court—not from a holding that does not yet exist.

That also limits the case’s precedential weight. Even if Judge Vargas grants discovery, § 1782 orders are highly procedural and discretionary. Intel itself emphasizes that satisfying the statute’s threshold requirements means the court may provide assistance, not that it must. Courts then consider factors including whether the discovery target participates in the foreign proceeding, the foreign tribunal’s receptivity to American judicial assistance, whether the request appears designed to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions, and whether the requested discovery is unduly intrusive or burdensome.

Here, Thrive and Kushner are outsiders to the contemplated Swiss proceeding, which generally favors § 1782 assistance because a Swiss authority may have no direct power to compel them. But breadth, confidentiality, the posture of the Swiss matter, and the existence of several coordinated U.S. applications give the court substantial room to narrow or condition any relief.

The Thrive proceeding is only one piece of the litigation architecture.

UEFA has filed four § 1782 applications in three U.S. jurisdictions seeking discovery from different participants or potential information holders associated with FFE. In addition to Thrive and Kushner in New York, applications target FIFA-related U.S. entities in Florida; BANN Ventures and Greg Maffei in Colorado; and JPMorgan entities and executives in a separate Southern District of New York matter. None of those proceedings had produced a merits determination when the applications were recently tracked.

That strategy is sophisticated for a simple reason: major transactions do not have one paper trail.

The governing body has one set of records. The investor has another. The financial adviser may have valuation materials and communications neither side retained in precisely the same form. Individual executives may possess messages, calendars, drafts, or recollections that fill gaps between institutional files.

Viewed that way, UEFA is attempting to reconstruct FFE horizontally rather than merely demanding FIFA’s own explanation of what happened.

For FIFA, that creates a corresponding risk of inconsistent discovery rulings. Four judges could confront overlapping but not identical questions about whether the contemplated Swiss proceeding qualifies, whether UEFA is an interested person, whether intervention is appropriate, and how much discovery is proportionate.

One court denying discovery therefore may not end the effort. One court granting it may create momentum elsewhere.

The best response to UEFA is not that § 1782 never applies before foreign litigation begins. Supreme Court precedent forecloses that broad proposition.

The stronger argument is narrower: Congress permitted discovery for reasonably contemplated proceedings, not discovery to help somebody decide whether it can manufacture a proceeding worth bringing.

That distinction is difficult but important.

If UEFA already intends to present a defined criminal complaint under Article 158, has identified a procedural route for doing so, possesses rights to submit the evidence to Swiss authorities, and is using the U.S. material to support that concrete effort, its position looks much closer to Intel.

If instead UEFA is gathering every available transaction record first so it can decide later whether some viable accusation emerges, FIFA’s “fishing expedition” characterization becomes considerably stronger under Certain Funds.

Reasonable judges could differ depending on the evidence UEFA submitted about its Swiss plans. That makes any eventual order here more fact-bound than revolutionary.

And even a denial might not be fatal. Certain Funds specifically recognized that changed circumstances can justify a renewed § 1782 application. If UEFA later files a Swiss complaint, if prosecutors open an investigation, or if its procedural rights become clearer, the threshold calculus changes substantially.

The discovery battle should not become a backdoor verdict on the transaction.

FFE’s withdrawal does not prove that it was unlawful. A $20 billion implied valuation does not, by itself, establish that FIFA was being underpaid. A private investor pursuing favorable economics does not establish misconduct. A governing body considering outside capital does not establish criminal mismanagement.

Likewise, UEFA’s pursuit of evidence does not establish that Swiss prosecutors will accept its theory—or investigate at all.

Thrive and Kushner occupy an especially important position in that distinction. The reporting and UEFA’s papers do not identify them as intended defendants in the contemplated Swiss proceeding. They are being pursued as sources of evidence because an investor’s internal files may reveal how the proposed transaction was understood from the other side of the negotiating table.

That is not a semantic distinction. It is the difference between being accused of wrongdoing and becoming an involuntary witness to somebody else’s dispute.

This is where the case becomes bigger than FIFA.

Private capital has moved rapidly into teams, leagues, commercial-rights businesses, media ventures, tournaments, and other sports assets. Financial diligence traditionally focuses on valuation, cash flows, governance rights, exit opportunities, regulatory restrictions, and downside scenarios.

Sports-governance transactions add another category of risk: institutional legitimacy.

A transaction can make perfect financial sense on a spreadsheet and still become radioactive if the governing body lacked political authority to pursue it, stakeholders believe the process bypassed them, internal approval procedures are disputed, or the deal becomes part of a leadership struggle.

And if litigation follows, the investor’s diligence file can become evidence.

Internal models prepared to determine what an asset is worth may later be cited to argue that somebody else sold too cheaply. Emails discussing approval risk may become evidence about whether transaction participants understood that necessary institutional consent was missing. Draft governance provisions can illuminate who expected to control what. Internal investment-committee materials can memorialize weaknesses the investor identified long before they became public controversies.

That does not mean investors should document less. Quite the opposite. It means sports governance belongs inside transaction diligence rather than outside it.

Who actually possesses authority to sell the rights? Which approvals are conditions precedent? Can elected officials reverse the transaction? Which stakeholders have consultation or consent rights? What happens after a leadership change? What information will remain confidential if the deal collapses? Where are advisers and investors located, and what discovery regimes can reach their records?

A sports property may be global. Its documents are still sitting somewhere.

And § 1782 means that “somewhere” matters.

Judge Vargas first has to deal with the procedural traffic jam.

She can grant or deny FIFA’s subsidiaries’ request to intervene, allow limited participation, defer the application, or proceed directly to UEFA’s request. She then must determine whether UEFA satisfies § 1782’s statutory prerequisites—including whether the contemplated Swiss proceeding is sufficiently concrete and whether UEFA qualifies as an interested person seeking material genuinely “for use” in that proceeding.

If UEFA clears those thresholds, the court still must decide whether discovery should be granted as a matter of discretion under Intel and, if so, how broadly.

A grant would likely begin another phase rather than end this one. Thrive and Kushner could challenge particular subpoenas, privileges, burdens, confidentiality, or scope. Parallel applications in Florida, Colorado, and New York will continue developing. And the single fact most capable of changing the legal landscape would occur outside the United States: UEFA filing its contemplated Swiss complaint or Swiss authorities opening a formal investigation.

Meanwhile, the political fight around FFE is still widening. On September 12, Danish federation president Jesper Møller accused FIFA’s Legal Committee of avoiding substantive questions about the proposal, while FIFPRO Europe on September 14 called for broader governance reforms and greater formal participation by players, clubs, and leagues.

That makes the U.S. discovery proceeding more than litigation cleanup after an abandoned transaction.

FFE never became an investment vehicle. But it has become a test of how much of a governing body’s internal deal process can be reconstructed through outsiders once the politics turn hostile.

The $20 billion deal disappeared. The documents did not. And in modern sports transactions, the due-diligence file may outlive the deal that created it.